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THE DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
Regulation of Business Without Litigation
By RONALD INGRAM*
DETAILED government regulation of business is generally consid-
ered a new development. This is in large part true, but one of the most
ubiquitous governmental actions is now almost half a century old in
California. In 1913, the California Legislature decreed that every
employer must maintain a safe place of employment.' Though the
duty of employer was in part a reflection of the common law, two
aspects of the law were new: it was backed by a generalized system of
workmen's compensation, and a procedure was established whereby
the government through regulation could establish the minimum re-
quirements of maintaining a safe place to work.
Lack of Litigation
Most lawyers are probably unaware of these latter regulations..2
There have been very few appellate cases which have considered them
at all, and those few only in connection with their application as a
standard for establishing due care.3 There are no reported cases involv-
ing the reasonableness of these regulations, the propriety of the
administrative procedure leading to their promulgation, or otherwise
concerned with the regulations themselves. This phenomenon of no
litigation is the subject of this article. Why has this type of regulation
escaped legal controversy?
Several hypotheses are possible. One is that the regulations are
so unimportant that they are not worthy of legal concern. This is
plainly not true. The general safety orders which have been issued
cover to some degree virtually every employment in California, 4 and
many of the requirements are costly to the employer. In terms of
dollars and cents many instances could be cited where the possibility
of escaping the force of the regulations, even temporarily, would be
well worth the cost of litigation. Another possibility is that the reg-
ulations and the statutes controlling their promulgation are so clear
and have been so scrupulously followed that any litigation would
be patently frivolous. Obviously this could not be true-no statute
*Member, Second Year class.
1 Cal. Stat. 1913, ch. 176, § 52, p. 306.
2 This is certainly not due to any lack of volume of these regulations. They occupy
several thousand pages of Title 8, California Administrative Code.
3 Anrenta v. Churchill, 42 Cal. 2d 448, 267 P.2d 303 (1954); Mula v. Meyer, 132
Cal. App. 2d 279, 282 P.2d 107 (1955); Campbell v. Fong Wan, 60 Cal. App. 2d 553,
141 P.2d 43 (1943). As to their application as safeguards to the public generally, Pierson
v. Holly Sugar Corp., 107 Cal. App. 2d 298, 237 P.2d 28 (1951).
4 8 CAL. ADM. CODE § 3203.
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is that free of ambiguity. But, in any event, this statute is in many
important respects singularly unclear. A few instances are necessary
to document this assertion.
Unclarity of the Regulatory Statute
The statute, which has remained essentially unchanged since 1913,r
speaks of two types of "orders": general and special.6 General safety
orders are promulgated by the Industrial Safety Board, composed of
four gubernatorial appointees and chaired by the Director of the
Department of Industrial Relations. 7 The general orders are pub-
lished in the California Administrative Code. The procedures used
in promulgation follow the California Administrative Procedure Act:
that is, there is notice of hearings, 8 hearings, 9 and publication of the
orders in the Register.10 While some of the general orders have vir-
tually universal application, e.g., those relating to handrails," illu-
mination,12 others relate to specific industries, e.g., logging,13 mining,14
and others to special types of equipment such as elevators, 15 and
gold dredges.' They range from highly detailed engineering speci-
fications to the most vague and general requirements.' 7
Special safety orders are of a different class. These relate to spe-
cific employers and specific hazardous conditions. Generally, a special
order results from an investigation by one of the Division of Indus-
trial Safety's inspectors of a particular place of employment. For
example, an inspector visits a factory and finds certain specific vio-
lations of the general orders and also a condition which, in his opinion,
is hazardous but which is not specifically covered by any detailed
general order. He then "writes up" the place of employment, giving
a copy to the employer. This form describes the conditions which the
inspector believes should be corrected. If the employer does not
comply, he receives in due course an "Order to Show Cause" which
tells him, in substance, that unless he requests a hearing he will be
r Cal. Stat. 1913, ch. 176, §§ 1-92, pp. 279-320.
6 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 6307-08.
7 CAL. LABOR CODE § 140.
8 CAL. Gov. CODE § 11423.
9 CAL. Gov. CODE § 11425.
'
0 CAL. Gov. CODE § 11409.
"18 CAL. ADm. CODE § 3227.
12 8 CAL. ADm. CODE § 3242.
13 8 CAL. ADm. CODE §§ 5200-392.
14 8 CAL. ADM. CODE §§ 5900-6147.
15 8 CAL. ADM. CODE §§ 3000-104.
1' 8 CAL. ADm. CODE §§ 4300-51.
17 8 CAL. ADM. CODE § 3242 (a) exemplifies such general regulations. It reads:
"Working areas, stairways, aisles, passageways, work benches and machines shall be pro-
vided with either natural or artificial illumination which is adequate and suitable to secure
the safety of employees."
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served with a special safety order which will require him to comply
with the report of the investigator.
Hearing
The statute requires a "hearing" before issuing a special safety
order.'8 This requirement of a hearing or, in practice, an opportunity
to be heard, is the first glaring ambiguity. What kind of a hearing
and before whom? The statute is wholly silent. Fortunately, this
question has arisen infrequently, but when it has, the "hearing" is
held before either the Chief of the Division or one of his top assist-
ants. No formal record is made, the witnesses, if any, are not sworn
and the whole procedure would more accurately be described as a
"conference" between the Division and the particular employer rather
than a "hearing."
Judicial Review
What of judicial review? Violations of the orders, both special
and general, are misdemeanors."9 Assuming that the employer does
not wish to undergo the distress of a criminal charge, how may he
review the safety order, either general or special? One possible meth-
od is by starting a declaratory judgment proceeding in a superior
court. As far as general orders are concerned, jurisdiction of the
superior court could be based on the Administrative Procedure Act
which states that a declaratory judgment action may be brought in
the superior court to test the validity of "any regulation."20  It is
doubtful, however, whether this provision is applicable.
Section 6600 of the Labor Code provides that judicial review of
all orders of the Division may be had in the district courts of appeal
and the supreme court, impliedly excluding the superior courts, and
this implication is reinforced by another section,21 incorporated by
reference, which specifically so states.
Putting aside declaratory relief as doubtful jurisdictionally, the
disgruntled employer can try and have his case reviewed in a district
court of appeal. However, in order to do so, the employer must peti-
tion for a rehearing within twenty days of the "service" of any final
order as a jurisdictional prerequisite.22 With regard to general orders
this makes a modest amount of sense-presumably the petition would
18 CAL. LABOR CODE § 6500.
19 CAL. LABOR CODE § 6414.
20 CAL. Gov. CODE § 11440.
21 CAL. LABOR CODE § 6601 makes reference to the applicability of § 5955 thereof
which reads: "No court of this State, except the Supreme Court and the district courts of
appeal to the extent herein specified, has jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct, or annul
any order, rule, decision, or award of the commission, or to suspend or delay the operation
or execution thereof, or to restrain, enjoin, or interfere with the commission in the per-
formance of its duties but a writ of mandate shall lie from the Supreme Court or the dis-
trict courts of appeal in all proper cases."
22 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 5901, 6602.
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be addressed to the Industrial Safety Board and it is reasonable to
require that the interested party make prompt application to avoid
undue delay in promulgating the general orders. Of course when
such an order would be "served" is a little more difficult to under-
stand. Perhaps publication in the register could be treated as construc-
tive service.
As a practical matter, the twenty day limitation with regard to
general orders is somewhat unrealistic. Few employers, if any, follow
the promulgation proceedings so closely as to know all of the possible
implications of a new series of regulations. It is, therefore, unreason-
able to expect employers to be in a position to file a petition for re-
hearing within the twenty day limitation. But even assuming that
an employer did file a petition within the time limit, what would be
the record which would be the basis of his appeal? Presumably the
petition and the denial thereof and perhaps the recorded testimony
at the public hearings, but none of these would, in all probability,
bear to any considerable degree on the precise regulation or the rea-
sons behind its issuance. This meager and probably largely irrelevant
matter, is all that the district court of appeal is permitted to consider
as the statute prohibits the taking of any additional evidence.2
With regard to "special" orders, the problem of service is rela-
tively simple; since the special order is delivered to the employer in
a manner not dissimilar from "service" in the ordinary sense. The
twenty day limitation is also practicable, but the record problem re-
mains. Perhaps the results of the informal conference, if there was
one, with whatever record was made at that time, could be used. The
real difficulty, however, is that the special order is typically in large
part no more than a recitation of the provisions of a general order
which the particular employer is violating. Is the respondent of a
special order to be permitted to attack the general order although the
time for so doing has long since past? If so, what is the record which
the court will consider as to the validity of the general order?
Historical Source of Difficulties
As an historical matter it is simple to trace down the source of
these difficulties. In the original act, the duty of promulgating safety
orders was vested in the Industrial Accident Commission.24 Enforce-
ment was also through an arm of the Commission and the review
procedures paralleled the review procedures of workmen's compen-
sation awards.25 While these review procedures make excellent sense
when applied to adjudicative functions of the Commission, they made
very little if any sense when applied to the quasi-legislative functions
23 CAL. LABOR CODE § 5951.
24 Cal. Stat. 1913, ch. 176, § 57, p. 307.
25 Cal. Stat. 1913, ch. 176, §§ 56, 63, 84-5, pp. 307-08, 318-19.
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of the Commission. In 1945, when the Commission was reorganized, 26
the functions of the Commission, with respect to safety orders, were
shifted to the Division of Industrial Safety and the Industrial Safety
Board, but no change was made with respect to the review procedures;
indeed, they were substantially incorporated by reference. 27 Though
this bit of history explains the problem, it does not help solve it.
Legal Sanctions
Our disgruntled employer, frustrated by this morass of confusion,
decides that it is not worth the trouble resolving these problems by
taking the initiative, so he then determines to violate the orders and
see what happens.
The Division has a rather substantial reserve of legal sanctions
available to enforce compliance.
Criminal Sanctions
Violations of the safety orders, both special and general, are mis-
demeanors.28 This criminal sanction is the most common enforce-
ment technique. It has its problems, mostly revolving around the
relationship between the district attorney and the Division. The office
of the district attorney is a busy one and violations of the orders are
not, at least on their face, either colorful or very important compared
to a great deal of the work handled by the district attorney. On the
whole, the relationship between Division inspectors and the local
prosecuting authorities has been good, but the district attorneys are
understandably somewhat hesitant to brand as criminal some of the
leading business men in their community. This is particularly true,
of course, where the violation of the safety order appears, to the lay-
man at least, as technical and not likely to result in any serious injury.
"Tag" Orders
Frequently the Division will have recourse to the district attorney
only after it has "tagged" the particular condition which is hazardous.
A "tag" order is a kind of administrative injunction. The inspector
simply attaches to the machine a large yellow or orange tag which
announces in no uncertain terms that use of the machine is prohibited
by order of the Division.2 9 If the tag is placed on a machine, it is
frequently so attached that it is impossible to use the machine with-
out removing the tag. To remove the tag is itself a misdemeanor
26 Cal. Stat. 1945, ch. 1431, § 28, pp. 2688-89.
27 Cal. Stat. 1945, ch. 1431, §§ 8, 28, 78-110, pp. 2685, 2688-89, 2698-705.
2 CAL. LABOR CODE § 6414.
29 The language used in such tags is as follows: "WARNING. This -- - has
been inspected and is considered unsafe. Further use of this .... , until it has been
made safe, may constitute a misdemeanor rendering the employer liable to fine and im-
prisonment, or both. John Doe, Safety Engineer, Division of Industrial Safety." The
reverse side of the tag cites applicable provisions of the California Labor Code.
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under a separate section of the statute.30
These tag orders present an interesting legal problem. If the
analogy to the injunction is valid, it could well be argued that the
fact that the tag was unlawfully placed on the machine was not a
defense to the charge of removing the tag.a' This makes good sense
from the standpoint of effective administration of the act. The em-
ployer, at least in theory, has other methods of reviewing the legiti-
macy of the Division's action in declaring the machine unsafe. The
Division's action is certainly entitled to the presumption of validity,
and pending review of the agency's action the employer should not
be permitted to use the machine at the risk of his employee's health
and safety. Thus, it is perfectly reasonable to make it a separate of-
fense to remove the tag without permission of the Division and to cut
off the defense of the impropriety of tagging the machine at all.
Injunctions
To some degree the analogy of the injunction is weakened by the
fact that the Division can apply to the courts for an injunction to
correct a "serious menace to lives or safety."3 2 The application must
be accompanied by an affidavit of the inspector sufficient to establish
a prima facie case.33 The injunction process has much to commend
it. It avoids, for one thing, the taint of the criminal charge, and, un-
like the criminal charge, a temporary restraining order corrects the
condition. Unfortunately no one knows what a "serious menace' is.
Some cases are obvious, but they are relatively rare since few em-
ployers will compel men to work in truly dangerous conditions once
the hazard has been pointed out. With the more refined or sophis-
ticated violations of the orders, it is difficult to categorize the viola-
tions as presenting a "serious menace."
Why No Litigation?
The above should suffice to show that there are enough legal
problems involved in the safety regulations as such to warrant some
litigation in the almost half-century of their existence. The question
remains as to why these problems have not been litigated.
Possible Liability
There are undoubtedly a number of reasons. Probably of rela-
tively slight significance is the fact that knowing violations of safety
orders, if they cause an accident, will subject the employer to work-
men's compensation liability for "serious and wilful misconduct."4
This liability cannot be insured against and thus comes directly from
30 CAL. LABOR CODE § 6511.
31 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
82 CAL. LABOR CODE § 6508.
33 CAL. LABOR CODE § 6509.
34 CAL. LtBoR CODE § 4553(a).
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the pocket of the employer.3 5 This collateral enforcement technique
was apparently not intended. The act originally did not specifically
refer to violations of the safety orders as per se "serious and wilful
misconduct," and the courts never quite did it either. But the courts
did consider violations of the safety orders as in a somewhat diffierent
class and recently the legislature limited and codified the violation of
a safety order situation. 6 Though this liability exists and it is of
some consequence, it seems doubtful that most employers are either
aware of it or would be responsive to it.
Safety Is Good Business
A far more important reason is simply that safety is now generally
regarded as good business. As a simple matter of economics it saves
money for the employer to be safety conscious and to comply with
regulations which further safety. The premiums on compensation in-
surance are tied to the particular employer's experience, and a good
safety record saves money. The larger companies have learned this
and sometimes go to great lengths to promote safe working condi-
tions. It is fairly common for such employers to have safety engineers
on their staff. All this simply means that a very substantial segment
of the regulated community is responsive to the regulation and more
than willing to comply with reasonable rules. Of course it is this same
group of large employers who have the most at stake. They are the
ones who under other circumstances would test the regulations, as
they have the most to lose or gain by compliance or resistance. Be-
cause they are, in general, the most cooperative, much of the litiga-
tion simply never gets started.
Influence of Unions and Labor
Unions and labor generally also contribute to some degree to the
ease of enforcement. Safety is part of the gospel of the labor move-
ment-no one denies it, and many union officials are genuinely con-
cerned and usefully active in the field. Many of the violations of the
safety orders are brought to the attention of the Division through
unions and workers. To the extent that they are, the union people
will support the Division in any dispute with the employer. Here
again, there is a built in compliance factor within the regulated com-
munity.
Division of Safety Professionalism
Probably the most important single factor favoring compliance,
however, is the professionalism of the Division. This comes to the
fore in two places-in the way the regulations are drafted and in the
way they are enforced. The regulations are initially drafted by staff
personnel in the Division. In doing so, the Division has available
35 CAL. INs. CODE § 11661.
3 See, Comment, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 852 (1954).
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and uses the various codes prepared by nationally recognized safety
groups. The draft is then reviewed in detail by a committee which
includes professionals in the field who represent the various groups
who will be regulated. A great effort is made, generally successful,
to achieve agreement as to the terms of the regulations. The end
result are thus regulations which represent a professional consensus
of views as to what are sound rules.
The second aspect of professionalism is within the Division itself.
Traditionally the Division has emphasized its role as educator over
its function as policeman. Although not exclusively staffed by trained
engineers, most of the Division's agents are engineers, and all of the
supervisors are engineers. The rules are thus enforced with knowl-
edge of the reasons behind them. The agents are trained to spot
hazardous conditions and it is a tenet of the Division that there is no
job that cannot be done in comparative safety. The agents in the
field are expected to explain what the hazard is and are also expected
to develop a method of avoiding it. Enforcement is thus treated as
principally a job of education: how to persuade the employer to com-
ply with the regulations, not because they are regulations, but rather
because there is a safer way of doing the job. The whole tone of
enforcement is thus shifted from strict enforcement of the "book" to
education. At least one result of this system has been very substantial
cooperation and compliance.
These are probably the main reasons for the lack of litigation. It
is an enviable record and raises one final question: can any useful
generalizations be made from the experience of the Division? Prob-
ably not. Safety regulation is a uniquely saleable type of regulation.
Nonetheless, the professionalism of the Division does seem to be of
some significance. Safety engineering, though far from a mathemat-
ically absolute science, is capable of a considerable degree of pre-
cision. On many matters engineers can pretty well agree as to what
is and is not safe. There is thus a professional yardstick apart from
the law. The regulations are carefully drafted to conform to this
agreed upon yardstick, and they are enforced by professionals who
appreciate the importance of the yardstick. The end result has been
an absence of litigation.
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